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Executive Summary 
 
The overall goal of the Conflict Research 
Programme (CRP) is to provide an evidence-based 
strategic re-orientation of international engagement 
in places apparently afflicted by the world’s most 
intractable violent conflicts. Its premise is that in 
these places, the ability of public authorities to 
provide even the most basic level of governance is 
subject to the functioning of the ‘real politics’ of 
gaining, managing and holding power, which we 
argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This 
approach helps explain the frustrations of state-
building and institutionally-focused engagement; it 
can also inform the design of improved 
interventions, which reduce the risk and impact of 
conflict and violence in developing countries, 
alleviating poverty and insecurity. A key objective of 
our research, and a key contribution to the ‘Better 
Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to make policies 
better targeted, more nuanced and rooted in a clear 
understanding of the social condition that 
undergirds persistent contemporary conflict.  
 
The locations for research are Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. Our 
central hypothesis is that governance in these 
difficult places is dominated by the logic of a 
political marketplace. These political markets are 
turbulent, violent and integrated into regional and 
global networks of power and money. We also 
hypothesise that moral populism (most visible in 
identity politics, persecuting ideologies and violent 
extremism) is a counterpart to the marketisation of 
politics, and the two flourish in conditions of 
persistent uncertainty, conflict and trauma. Current 
policy frameworks and tools can neither capture the 
everyday realities of politics and governance in these 
difficult places, nor adjust to the dynamics of 
contested power relations. External interventions 
risk being enmeshed in logics of power and may end 
up inadvertently supporting violence and 
authoritarianism. At the same time, in all war-torn 
spaces, there are relatively peaceful zones: what we 
term ‘pockets of civicness’. These might be 
territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive local 
authorities) social (civil society groups helping the 
vulnerable or countering sectarian narratives, or 
customary courts solving disputes fairly) or external 
(interventions that regulate flows of political 
finance). 
 
 
The CRP will generate evidence-based, operationally 
relevant research that can enable real-time analysis 
of the dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civicness’ 
and public authority, enabling better interventions to 
manage and resolve armed conflict, reduce violence, 
and create conditions for more accountable and 
transparent governance. A core component of the 
CRP is to contribute to a better understanding of 
“what works” in addressing violent conflict across 
our research sites. We will develop comparative 
understanding of how different interventions affect 
violent conflict and the risk of renewed violent 
conflict, across our research sites. We will also 
examine the contextual factors that affect the 
effectiveness of these interventions. Intervention 
areas selected for comparative research: Security 
interventions; civil society and community 
mediation interventions; resource interventions; 
and interventions designed to strengthen authority 
and legitimacy, including at the sub-national level. 
We envisage emerging findings from our political 
economy analysis of conflict drivers to shape our 
comparative analysis of specific interventions.  
 
Our research methods include (a) comparative 
political ethnography (b) refined datasets (c) models 
of violence and political business (d) socio-political 
mapping of the structural drivers of conflict and the 
groups involved in political mobilisation and 
coercion and (e) action research exploring agents of 
change. We have a unique and robust infrastructure 
of local researchers and civil society networks 
across all our sites that will facilitate both fieldwork 
research and remote research. The CRP team is 
already closely engaged with key political processes 
– and regional actors - in the countries concerned, 
designed to promote peace, humanitarian action, 
human rights and democracy. This engagement is a 
key part of our method and will ensure that evidence-
based research is effectively communicated to 
institutions engaged in trying to reduce the risk and 
impact of violent conflict in our research sites. Our 
emphasis is upon a mix of research methods and 
mechanisms for engaging in policy and practice. In 
line with this flexible approach, we will hold an 
annual in-country workshop with each DFID country 
office, and key stakeholders, to work through the 
implications of our research for them in a practical, 
flexible and responsive way. This will be 
supplemented by regular written and face-to-
face/virtual communication with country staff.  
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Outline 
 
This paper reviews some of the datasets and 
quantitative research that are relevant to the 
research of the Conflict Research Programme (CRP). 
Several different types of data – including conflict 
episode data, conflict incident data, lethality data, 
conflict networks data, and humanitarian/food 
security data – are considered. The first part of the 
paper provides a brief background on how conflict 
data emerged, showing where the field is coming 
from. The subsequent section discusses how there 
has been a turn to disaggregated event conflict data 
and agency in recent years. This turn to agency fits 
the research purposes of the CRP, as a focus on 
agency is critical for studying the logics of conflict 
utilised by the CRP, namely the political marketplace, 
moral populism and ‘civicness’, along with public 
authority, namely the concern with authority at all 
levels including the state. These concepts are new to 
social science and therefore have not been directly 
measured, but several of the data sources and 
methods examined in this paper will be explored in 
relation to these logics, insofar as it is possible. The 
study of the political marketplace is best suited to 
quantitative analysis because the constituent 
elements of a functional market, namely financial 
flows and budgets, transactions and prices, can in 
principle be measured either directly or by proxy, and 
are susceptible to mathematical modelling. 
Measurements of moral populism would of 
necessity be indirect or inferred, while ‘civicness’ 
could be measured through events such as 
ceasefires and humanitarian action. The paper 
concludes with identifying several potential avenues 
for future data-driven research by the CRP. 
 Phase I in the history of conflict data:  a focus on 
conflict episodes. In 1963, David Singer established 
the Correlates of War (COW) project at the University 
of Michigan. The rationale for the start of the COW 
project was to uncover the causes of large-scale 
armed fighting between states. In order to extent 
conflict data to also include the ‘no war’ cases, the 
International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) project was 
established in 1982. With the Cold War waning, 
conflict researchers began to focus more on civil 
wars and violence against civilians, rather than 
dynamics of interstate conflicts which had been 
predominant prior to this. The Uppsala Conflict 
Dataset Program (UCDP) began to collect data on 
both interstate and intrastate armed conflicts in 
1988. Another major dataset that appeared in the 
1980s is the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. The  
 
 
MAR dataset includes information on politically 
significant communal groups, which are often ethnic  
 
and religious minorities. The creation of the MAR 
dataset was crucial in order to get insights into the 
dynamics leading up to wars within states. 
 Phase II in the history of conflict data: a turn to 
disaggregated data and agency. The revolution in 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology 
has made it possible to code geographic information 
on armed conflict. The geographic coordinates of 
the location of an incident can be tagged onto an 
observation in the dataset. This, in turn, makes it 
possible to consider the local context of conflict. 
Disaggregated data not only helps to study the local 
nature of armed conflict, it also shifts the focus to 
agency rather than structural variables associated 
with a given country.  
 The political marketplace. The focus on agency in 
recent data-driven conflict research has led to the 
publication of some recent quantitative work and 
their associated datasets that are relevant for 
examining the three logics identified by the CRP. 
While it is in practice almost impossible to measure 
political budgets and the price of loyalty directly – as 
doing so would require significant intelligence 
resources – some studies have analysed networks 
and relationships to study transactional politics. Yet, 
it is clear that the covert actions of the political 
business leaders conducting transactional politics 
makes studying the political marketplace difficult. 
Future research should try to develop more precise 
proxy indicators of the political marketplace and 
collect more rigorous data. 
 Moral populism. There are some quantitative studies 
that have examined the role of grievances, identity, 
and mobilisation, yet these studies have produced 
contradictory findings. What is more, these studies 
are all seriously hampered by the difficulty to 
operationalise these concepts. Indeed, since it is 
difficult to operationalise and measure ideas, moral 
populism is difficult to examine in a large-n study.  
 Public civicness. Public civicness has received scant 
attention in the quantitative conflict research 
literature, but civicness could, in principle, be 
measured through events such as ceasefires and 
humanitarian action as proxies for civicness – 
though it should be noted that civicness is not 
necessarily equated with peacemaking. Much of the 
literature on peacemaking efforts focuses on 
peacemaking between states. Those large-n studies 
that do focus on peacemaking in civil war mainly 
look at efforts aimed at concluding a comprehensive 
peace agreement that is supposed to bring peace to 
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the entire country. Hence, while the analysis of local 
peacemaking efforts is already commonplace within 
the qualitative literature, data-driven research on 
local peacemaking has yet to develop. 
 Sector Security Reform: Of the cross-cutting themes 
studied by the CRP, Sector Security Reform (SSR) 
has received relatively much attention within the field 
of quantitative conflict research. Most of these 
quantitative studies frame the issue in terms of the 
effectiveness of a standardised template of SSR. 
The evidence presented in these studies points in the 
direction that SSR is ineffective in preventing a 
resumption of violence. The CRP will instead frame 
the contested security landscape in a conflict-
affected country as a security arena, and with the 
intent to study the political drivers of controlling 
security actors and reducing violence. Future large-n 
research on SSR should at least try to model the 
complexity and fluidity of the security arena. A 
network analysis might be one fruitful avenue to do 
this. 
 The Political Market and Humanitarian Crisis: 
Quantitative conflict research has a long way to go 
to examine the links between humanitarian issues 
and armed conflict. This is particularly apparent with 
regard to the links between food security, the 
political marketplace, and armed violence. It is 
striking though that analyses on food security rarely 
takes conflict data into account. Datasets like 
ACLED could be used to get an indication of levels of 
armed violence in particular areas of a country which 
could then be related to the data gathered by the 
Integrated food security Phase Classification (IPC) 
system. Political marketplace metrics can similarly 
be linked to food insecurity and humanitarian crisis. 
It is necessary to link the political marketplace to the 
food security because the political marketplace 
generates the predatory politics that creates food 
insecurity.  
There are at least seven possible avenues for future 
data-driven research conducted by the CRP. 
 Network Analysis: The numerous actors within the 
context of civil wars pose serious challenges to the 
data collection and analysis efforts of quantitative 
research scholars. A network analysis has the 
potential to deal with the complexity of 
contemporary wars. Syria is a telling example of a 
country in which a huge amount of armed actors 
operate and in which novel sources of data have 
become available, using social media and other 
crowd-based technologies. The CRP could initiate a 
collaboration among the different conflict data 
initiatives for Syria, with The Carter Center as a key 
player, in order to map all these different actors and 
analyse the causes and consequences of the 
changes in these networks. The Syrian conflict 
dataset at the London School of Economics, which is 
based on crowd-seeding, would also be a very 
valuable resource to identify many conflict actors at 
specific site throughout Syria. In addition, the expert 
knowledge of the CRP country teams, as well as the 
local contacts of each country team, could be used 
to map relevant networks in each CRP focus country. 
If United Nations peacekeeping operations’ Joint 
Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) data on the DRC 
and South Sudan will be obtained, these datasets 
could also be used to map networks. Collecting data 
on all relevant actors allows for an assessment of 
how conflict networks are shaped, transformed, and 
connected. Networks data is also very suitable for 
mapping the fragmentation of public authorities, as 
on the basis of these data different power networks 
can be identified. Crucially, with network data, the 
CRP could potentially analyse the logic of the 
political marketplace. One way to do this would be, 
for example, to examine whether transactional 
politics underlie changes in the relationships 
between all relevant actors in South Sudan from 
either 2005 or 2011 onwards.  
 Non-Violent and Violent Resistance and Changing 
Patterns of Authority: Another research project could 
focus on explaining how a centralised political 
authority fragments into localised contested public 
authorities. Syria is an insightful case to examine in 
this regard. Prior to 2011, many observers interested 
in Syrian affairs believed that Syria was a stable 
state. Yet, minor protests in January 2011 had 
evolved into a massive uprising demanding 
democratic reforms by March 2011. The creation of 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011 marked 
another turning point. A systematic analysis of data 
on nonviolent and violent protest in Syria could shed 
light on how nonviolent protest escalated into armed 
conflict. Data on protests and armed clashes could 
be extracted from the Global Database of Events, 
Language, and Tone (GDELT) dataset. The CRP 
relates to the combined logics of the political market 
and moral populism (i.e. the business constraints of 
operating in a war economy alongside the utility of 
appeals to identity politics). If moral populists 
cannot fracture public civicness, they will resort to 
violent intimidation to curtail popular protest against 
them. A disaggregated analysis of the evolution of 
nonviolent and violent protest – with a focus on the 
interaction between the state, civil society, and the 
armed opposition – could shed light on aspects of 
the logic of moral populism. 
 Peace Events: Another promising research project 
would be to study the effectiveness of local 
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peacemaking efforts. A wealth of quantitative 
studies have shown how likely ceasefires are to hold 
on a national level, yet what explains the durability of 
local ceasefires remains a gap in research. Since the 
Syrian Conflict data at the London School of 
Economics maps both peace and conflict events, 
this dataset could be used to model the 
effectiveness of local peacemaking. Another 
potential data source would be the UN missions 
JMAC data on the DRC or South Sudan. The study of 
local peacemaking efforts, using systematic data, 
could provide insight into the logic of the public 
civicness, as well as the logic of the political 
marketplace. Local peacemaking efforts are often a 
result of a bottom-up call for peace. On the other 
hand, the logic of the political marketplace suggest 
that whether local peacemaking efforts are 
successful depends on whether political 
entrepreneurs can reach an agreement about the 
price of loyalty or a division of the spoils. Depending 
on whether it will be possible to get systematic 
information on why armed actors conclude local 
agreements, a fruitful research project would be to 
examine whether successful local peacemaking 
efforts in the DRC and/or South Sudan are the 
product of skilled and resourced actors operating 
within a political marketplace.  
 Displacement and Conflict: The CRP could also focus 
on how patterns of violence influence patterns of 
displacement of people and vice versa. Iraq would be 
a suitable candidate case to study the links between 
armed violence and displacement for two reasons.  
Firstly, there is high quality data on both 
displacement and violence patterns on Iraq. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Iraq has seen 
multiple and varied waves of forced displacement. 
These different waves of displacement give a lot of 
variation in the data, which can be leveraged to get 
insights into when and where people flee from armed 
violence. For instance, it could be examined whether 
state-orchestrated displacement and displacement 
as a result of state collapse impact patterns of 
violence differently. It would also be possible to 
examine the impact of displaced people returning to 
their place of origin. Finally, it would be a possibility 
to examine whether displacement from and to rural 
or urban areas have divergent effects. The study of 
patterns of displacements and violence relates to 
several overarching themes within the CRP. The 
different waves of displacements in Iraq all took 
place under different contextual circumstances. For 
example, the wave of displaced people that took 
place between 2006 and 2008 was very much a 
result of sectarian violence, which, in turn, came 
about through moral populism. In addition, the 
different groups of displaced people in Iraq often 
relate to different authority structures. How these 
groups relate to a particular authority structure might 
influence the propensity of armed conflict related to 
displacement. Finally, displacement does not 
necessarily have to result in violence. Indeed, the 
logic of public civicness might shed light on why 
people fleeing can maintain peaceful relations with 
their host community. 
 Transnational Conflict Dynamics: The CRP will also 
examine transnational conflict drivers, and in doing 
so important information about conflict networks 
could be revealed. Indeed, disaggregation is 
important, but is equally important to look beyond 
the borders of a state affected by civil war. The CRP 
will draw on the Transnational Violent and Coercive 
Politics in Africa (TVCPA) dataset, which can be 
extended to also cover the Middle East for the 
research purposes of the CRP. The analysis of 
transnational conflict data is relevant for the CRP 
because external support to domestic players has 
important ramifications for how the political 
marketplace operates. A leader of state that has a 
strong position in a regional marketplace can more 
efficiently prevent external support to rebels, which 
makes it easier to dominate the domestic patronage 
system. By contrast, leaders of a state in a 
subordinate position in the region will experience 
great difficulty in regulating others’ entry into the 
domestic political market. Mapping the extent of 
transnational conflict, as well as shifts in which 
countries are the target of external support, thus 
gives insight into the dynamics of what de Waal 
refers to as a regionally integrated political 
marketplace. 
 Conflict, political markets and Food Security: The CRP 
will also address the links between conflict and food 
security. The data used by humanitarians to assess 
food security is the integrated food security phase 
classification (IPC) system, which is a five-level 
scale that is intended to help governments and other 
humanitarian actors to quickly understand a food 
security crisis and take action. It is striking though 
that analyses on food security rarely take conflict 
data into account. Conflict datasets could be used to 
get an indication of levels of armed violence in 
particular areas of a country. Our political 
marketplace measurements can be used similarly. 
This information could, in turn, be used to get better 
predictions of food security. The CRP research on 
the links between conflict and food security would 
thus have to address questions about how conflict 
assessment data including violent incident reporting 
can be factored in to projections of humanitarian 
crises: is it possible to confidently predict that 
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certain patterns of violence are predictors of 
worsening hunger? To answer this question, it will be 
examined how the processes of obtaining and 
analysing conflict data and food security data can be 
aligned, with the aim of enriching both. In addition, it 
could be examined how political marketplace 
indicators and peace events help in assessing food 
security.  
 Comparing Data Collection Methodologies and 
Setting up a Network of Networks: The major 
obstacle to data-driven conflict research is arguably 
not necessarily a lack of data, but that different 
datasets have not been merged enough. The main 
reason for this is that these datasets are all 
developed independently from each other, often with 
a singular purpose. Hence, what is necessary in the 
future is creating ‘networked’ data – a network of 
network data – through merging different types of 
data on the basis of common guidelines. The CRP 
could lead a collaborative project that would try 
develop these type of guidelines and would create 
networked data based on these guidelines. This 
project would also make a comparison possible of 
the strengths and weakness of different data 
sources, as well as the different methodologies used 
by actors collecting conflict data. The Syrian case is 
a good choice for this project because it well 
documented and extremely complex. 
Introduction 
 
Otto von Bismarck famously stated that sausages 
cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know 
how they are made. The same has been said about 
conflict data.1 Producing high quality data in conflict 
situations is challenging because contemporary 
armed conflicts are volatile and complex – and it is 
in the interest of conflict parties to operate covertly 
and misrepresent the situation to their political and 
military advantage.2 Moreover, the turmoil and 
dangers associated with armed conflicts make it 
difficult for journalists, academics, humanitarians, 
                                                     
1 Ruggeri A, Gizelis T-I and Dorussen H. (2011) Events Data 
as Bismarck's Sausages? Intercoder Reliability, Coders' 
Selection, and Data Quality. International Interactions 37: 
340-361. 
2On the complexity of contemporary wars, see: Kaldor M. 
(2007) New and Old Wars, Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, Weinstein JM. (2006) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of 
Insurgent Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, de Waal A. (2015) The Real Politics of the Horn of 
Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power, Cambridge: 
Polity. 
3 De Waal A. (2004) The Politics of Destabilisation in the 
Horn, 1989-2001. In: De Waal A (ed) Islamism and Its 
and other actors to collect information. As a result of 
these information collection challenges, routine data 
collection is interrupted or misleading and conflict 
datasets often underreport incidents.3   
Indeed, there is often a huge level of variation in 
conflict fatality data. For example, in 2007, the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) published a 
report – based on five retrospective mortality 
surveys – in which it was claimed that around 5.4 
million people died between 1998 and 2007 because 
of the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). It was further estimated that more than 90 
percent of these 5.4 million people died from war-
exacerbated disease, malnutrition, or other 
nonviolent causes.4 While the number of people that 
have died in the DRC surely is tragically high, several 
subsequent critical analyses of IRC’s data and 
methodology raised doubts about the relatively low 
baseline mortality rate used in the IRC study, doubts 
about whether the survey locations were 
appropriately selected, and doubts about the use of 
questionable estimate methods. Indeed, other 
surveys suggest that the number of deaths as result 
of war in the DRC is much lower.5 
Another example of the unreliability of conflict data 
is that, because of narrow coding rules, one of the 
most prominent dataset on armed conflicts, the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), misses 
cases in which one or more national armies along 
with their proxy armed groups fight another coalition 
of one or more national armies along with their proxy 
armed groups. A telling example of this is the fight 
over the town of Damazin at the Kurmuk border 
between Ethiopia and Sudan. As recalled by de Waal, 
in November 1989, the “SPLA and Ethiopian troops, 
crossed the border at Kurmuk and were poised to 
take the town of Damazin, and the nearby Blue Nile 
dam that generated Khartoum’s electricity supply. 
The Sudanese army was helpless – and was saved 
only by a secret commando action by the EPLF, 
which [at the invitation of and in coordination with 
the Sudanese] defeated the Sudan People’s 
Enemies in the Horn of Africa. London: Hurst, Weidmann 
NB. (2015) On the Accuracy of Media-based Conflict Event 
Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59: 1129-1149, 
Duursma A. (2018) Counting Deaths While Keeping Peace: 
An Assessment of the JMAC's Field Information and 
Analysis capacity in Darfur. International Peacekeeping. 
4 International Rescue Committee. (1 May 2007) Mortality 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An ongoing crisis. 
5 An example of such a survey is a survey published by the 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 2007. Available 
at: http://dhsprogram.com/what-we-do/survey/survey-
display-239.cfm.  
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Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Ethiopians in 
January 1990.”6 This armed clash is not taken into 
account by the UCDP because the UCDP only 
considers states as secondary parties that can 
contribute troops, ignoring foreign rebel parties that 
fight along governments.  
In spite of the difficulties of conflict data collection 
and associated concerns about reliability and 
validity, conflict data holds great potential in the 
study of armed conflict. While comparative case 
studies are generally much more suitable for 
examining the causal mechanisms of a proposed 
theoretical argument, studies based on high quality 
conflict data have a comparative advantage in 
identifying general patterns.7 Hence, rather than 
being opposites or mutually exclusive, large-n 
studies and in-depth case studies are 
complementary methods.8 This data synthesis paper 
reviews some of the datasets and quantitative 
research that has been produced that are relevant to 
the research of the CRP. Crucially, several potential 
avenues for future data-driven research by the CRP 
are identified. 
The paper references the logics of conflict utilised by 
the CRP, namely the political marketplace, moral 
populism and ‘civicness’, along with public authority, 
namely concerned with authority at levels lower than 
the state. These concepts are new to social science 
and therefore have not been directly measured, but 
several of the data sources and methods examined 
in this paper will be explored in relation to these 
logics, insofar as it is possible. The study of the 
political marketplace is best suited to quantitative 
analysis because the constituent elements of a 
functional market, namely financial flows and 
budgets, transactions and prices, can in principle be 
measured either directly or by proxy, and are 
susceptible to mathematical modelling. 
Measurements of moral populism would of 
necessity be indirect or inferred, while ‘civicness’ 
could be measured through events such as 
ceasefires and humanitarian action. 
                                                     
6 de Waal A. (2015) The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: 
Money, War and the Business of Power, Cambridge: Polity. 
7 Geddes B. (1990) How the Cases You Choose Affect the 
Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. 
Political Analysis 2: 131-150, Lieberson S. (1991) Small N's 
and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in 
Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases. 
Social Forces 70: 307-320. 
8 See: Lieberman ES. (2005) Nested Analysis as a Mixed-
Method Strategy for Comparative Research. American 
Political Science Review 99: 435, Small ML. (2011) How to 
Conduct a Mixed Methods Study: Recent Trends in a 
This review is organised in the following manner. The 
first part provides a brief background on how conflict 
data emerged, showing where the field is coming 
from. The subsequent section discusses how there 
has been a turn to disaggregated event conflict data 
and agency in recent years. Two major conflict event 
datasets currently exist: the UCDP Georeferenced 
Event Dataset (GED) and the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. The 
creation of these datasets allows for the testing of 
theoretical arguments that previously simply could 
not have been tested in a large-n study, but this turn 
to disaggregated event data also brings with it 
questions about the quality of this data and the 
politics surrounding conflict data. Next, this review 
turns to an assessment of the most recent 
developments with regard to how conflict data is 
used to analyse armed conflict. More specifically, 
this section reviews whether, and if so how, conflict 
data has been used to examine the logics of moral 
populism and the political marketplace. Current data 
collection efforts that relate to public civicness are 
also discussed. The subsequent section briefly 
discusses some large-n studies that have been 
conducted to examine issues related to sector 
security reform, local peacemaking, and 
humanitarian action. Finally, the last section 
discusses several options for large-n analyses of 
conflict data conducted by the CRP.  
A Brief History of Conflict Data 
 
The emergence of conflict data is tied to the 
behavioural revolution in the social sciences. In the 
late 1950s, several scholars began to study armed 
conflict in what they often referred to as ‘the 
scientific manner’: through using formally stated 
arguments and systematic empirical analysis.9 
David Singer established the Correlates of War 
(COW) project at the University of Michigan in 1963. 
The rationale for the start of the COW project was to 
uncover the causes of large-scale armed fighting 
between states.10 The COW project defines an 
Rapidly Growing Literature. The Annual Review of Sociology 
37. 
9 Gleditsch KS, Metternich NW and Ruggeri A. (2014) Data 
and progress in peace and conflict research. Journal of 
Peace Research 51: 301-314, Clayton G. (2014) Quantitative 
and Econometric Methedologies. In: DeRouen K and 
Newman E (eds) Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars. 
Abingdon: Routledge  
10 For more on the Correlates of War project see 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Note, however, that 
Richardson gathered conflict data on what he described as 
“deathly quarrels” from the 1930s and published a seminal 
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interstate war as a war that take place between or 
among states, which involves sustained combat, 
organised armed forces which are capable of 
“effective resistance” on both sides, and results in a 
minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities 
within a twelve month period.11 The COW data is still 
the most frequently used data to study interstate 
war.  
One disadvantage of the COW data is that it only 
includes cases of war, yet it is crucial to also look at 
the ‘no war’ cases if one wants to explain why war 
breaks out or not. To put it in methodological terms, 
the COW project selects on the dependent variable. 
The creation of the International Crisis Behaviour 
(ICB) project in the early 1980s was very much 
motivated by the idea that the systematic study of 
cases that did not escalate to war could provide 
insight into the conditions that may prevent violence. 
The ICB dataset includes cases in which the decision 
makers of a state perceive a threat to their basic 
values and a limited time to respond to these threats. 
The leaders also need to perceive a high likelihood of 
involvement in military hostilities.12 Hence, the 
creation of the ICB allowed scholars to study ‘near 
misses’ like the Cuban Missile Crisis that did not 
escalate to war. 
With the Cold War waning, conflict researchers 
began to focus more on civil wars and violence 
against civilians, rather than dynamics of interstate 
conflicts which had been the predominant focus 
prior to this. To this purpose, the COW project began 
to collect data on intrastate wars from 1982 
onwards.13 However, as a result of employing the 
1000 battle-related deaths threshold, the COW 
project missed the many low-intensity intrastate 
armed conflicts. It also did not adapt to the changing 
nature of wars and the predominance of civilian 
casualties in contemporary conflicts. Moreover, the 
COW project continues to make a rigid distinction 
between interstate and intrastate armed conflict. 
                                                     
study on these data in 1948. The COW project built on 
several earlier conflict data collection efforts like the one by 
Richardson. See: Richardson LF. (1948) Variation of the 
frequency of fatal quarrels with magnitude. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 43: 523-546. 
11 Small M and Singer JD. (1982) Resort to Arms: 
International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Sage. 
12 Brecher M and Wilkenfeld J. (1982) Crises in World 
Politics. World Politics 34: 380-417. 
13 Small M and Singer JD. (1982) Resort to Arms: 
International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Sage. 
14 Sundberg R and Harbom L. (2011) Systematic Data 
Collection: Experiences from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program. In: Höglund K and Öberg M (eds) Understanding 
Hence, the COW project overlooked the blurring of 
the internal and external aspects of armed conflict. 
The UCDP, which began to annually publish conflict 
data in the Stockholm Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) Yearbook from 1988 onwards, also collects 
data on both interstate and intrastate armed 
conflicts.14 The UCDP defines armed conflicts as a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two conflict actors, of which at least one is 
the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths 
in one calendar year. The UCDP does include an 
intensity variable which labels armed conflicts with 
at least 25 but less than 1,000 battle-related deaths 
as minor armed conflict and refers to conflicts with 
more than more than 1000 battle-related deaths in 
one calendar year as war.15 Accordingly, just like the 
COW project, the UCDP is particularly concerned with 
conflict intensity measured in number of battle-
related death. Yet, the UCDP has a lower battle-
related deaths threshold for conflicts included in its 
dataset. The UCDP’s use of a lower threshold of 
battle-related deaths to measure armed conflict than 
the COW project is very much linked to an increased 
interest in armed violence within states. Although 
civil wars can be extremely bloody, the UCDP has 
identified many low-intensity intrastate armed 
conflicts.  The significance of the lower battle-related 
deaths threshold of the UCDP became particularly 
apparent with the increasing number of smaller 
intrastate conflicts during the 1990s. This explains 
why the UCDP is used relatively more frequently than 
the COW project to analyse intrastate conflicts. 
However, like the COW project, the UCDP 
foregrounded battle-related deaths, which made it 
overlook civilian deaths. In other words, the UCDP 
Armed Conflict Dataset does not measure 
contemporary conflicts, because most violence is 
directed against civilians and this is not adequately 
captured in the UCDP.16 In addition, the UCDP 
Peace Research: Methods and Challenges. London: 
Routledge. 
15 Gleditsch NP, Wallensteen P, Eriksson M, et al. (2002) 
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of 
Peace Research 39. 
16 However, note that, unlike the COW project, the UCDP 
does record a civilian that dies as a result of armed 
clashes between armed organized groups as a battle-
related death. Yet, the direct targeting of civilians by 
organized armed groups was ignored by the UCDP.  It was 
not until 2007 that the UCDP began to systematically 
collect data on direct violence against civilians conducted 
by organized armed groups, which the UCDP refers to as 
one-sided violence. See: Eck K and Hultman L. (2007) One-
Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New 
Fatality Data. Ibid.44: 233-246. 
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continued to focus on states, while in reality the 
warring parties are networks of state and non-state 
actors. 
Another major dataset that appeared in the 1980s is 
the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, which was 
developed at the University of Maryland by Ted 
Robert Gurr and James Scarritt in 1986. The MAR 
dataset includes information on politically 
significant communal groups, which are often ethnic 
and religious minorities. A group is considered to be 
politically significant if this group collectively suffers 
or benefits from systematic discriminatory 
treatment at the hands of other societal groups. The 
group also needs to be the foundation of political 
mobilisation in defence of self-defined interests.17 
The creation of the MAR dataset was crucial in order 
to get insights into the dynamics leading up to wars 
within states.18 
Conflict research began to burgeon with the 
collection of more elaborate data on conflict 
processes throughout the 1990s, with another 
growth spurt from the turn of the century onwards. 
Illustrative in this regard are several datasets created 
by the UCDP. In 2002, the UCDP published conflict 
data that covered data on conflicts from 1946 
onwards.19 In 2007, the UCDP started to collect data 
on violence against civilians in civil war, which was 
referred to as one-side violence.20 In the same year, 
the UCDP also began to collect data on armed 
conflict between non-state actors, including intra 
rebel violence and communal violence.21 And in 
2010, the UCDP published data on how armed 
conflicts terminate.22 
Furthermore, several datasets became available that 
focused on conflict dyads rather than conflicts. 
Many conflict episodes involved more than two 
conflict parties. It is therefore often possible to 
identify several pairs of conflict parties in a single 
                                                     
17 Gurr TR. (1993) Minorities at Risk, Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace. 
18 Forsberg E, Duursma A and Grant L. (2012) Theoretical 
and Empirical Considerations in the Study of Ethnicity and 
Conflict: Summary Report from an International Workshop 
at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research. UCDP 
Paper No 8. 
19 Gleditsch NP, Wallensteen P, Eriksson M, et al. (2002) 
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of 
Peace Research 39. In addition, the COW project covers 
interstate conflicts from 1918 onwards. Several recent 
studies draw on data on conflict and violence that goes 
even further back. For example, see: Pinker S. (2011) The 
Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, 
London: Penguin. 
20 Eck K and Hultman L. (2007) One-Sided Violence Against 
Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data. Journal of 
Peace Research 44: 233-246. 
conflict. Maoz published dyadic data on militarised 
interstate disputes.23 Similarly, since 2008, the UCDP 
has annually released both conflict-level and dyadic-
level datasets.24  
In addition, many new datasets became available 
from the early 1990s onwards that could be used to 
study conflict. For instance, Jaggers and Gurr 
published their Polity 3 data on democracy in 1995, 
which enabled scholars to examine the relationship 
between democracy and civil war.25 Combining the 
Polity 3 data and the UCDP data, Hegre et al. show 
that robust democracies and harshly authoritarian 
states are relatively unlikely to experience civil wars, 
while intermediate regimes are the most conflict-
prone.26 
While more and better conflict data has constantly 
become available since the start of the COW project 
in 1963, the level of analysis of most of these data 
have been specified at the country or the conflict 
level. It is only since fairly recently that conflict data 
has become commonplace that takes the incident, 
rather than the state or the conflict episode, as the 
unit of analysis. The next section discusses this 
significant development, as well as some of the 
challenges associated with incident data. 
The Turn to Disaggregated Conflict 
Data 
 
The reason why the availability of disaggregated 
conflict data matters so much is that analyses based 
on cross-country data implicitly assume that civil 
wars are distributed uniformly throughout the 
country. This is almost never the case. Civil wars 
often either take place in and around the capital or in 
the periphery of the country, often along international 
borders.27 The revolution in Geographic Information 
21 Sundberg R, Eck K and Kreutz J. (2012) Introducing the 
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset. Ibid.49. 
22 Kreutz J. (2010) How and when armed conflicts end: 
Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset. Ibid.47: 
243-250. 
23 Maoz Z. (2005) Dyadic MID Dataset (version 2.0). 
24 Harbom L, Melander E and Wallensteen P. (2008) Dyadic 
Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007. Journal of 
Peace Research 45: 697-710. 
25 Jaggers K and Gurr TR. (1995) Tracking Democracy's 
Third Wave with the Polity III Data. Ibid.32: 469-482. 
26 Hegre H, Ellingsen T, Gates S, et al. (2001) Toward a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and 
Civil War, 1816-1992. The American Political Science 
Review 95: 33-48. 
27 Buhaug H and Gates S. (2002) The Geography of Civil 
War. Journal of Peace Research 39: 417-433, Aas Rustad 
SC, Buhaug H, Falch Å, et al. (2011) All Conflict is Local: 
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Systems (GIS) technology has made it possible to 
code geographic information on armed conflict. The 
geographic coordinates of the location of an incident 
can be tagged onto an observation in the dataset. 
This, in turn, makes it possible to consider the local 
context of conflict. 
Georeferenced, disaggregated events-level conflict 
data facilities conflict researchers to examine the 
micro-level dynamics of civil war, as well as making 
it possible to include a more detailed specification of 
actors in quantitative models. For instance, using 
disaggregated conflict data, Weidman and Ward 
show that areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
the civil war were more likely to experience armed 
fighting if the neighbouring areas experienced more 
armed violence; essentially showing a contagion 
effect. Also drawing on UCDP GED data, Beardsley 
and Gleditsch show that armed violence is more 
likely to spread if the conflict involves a rebel group 
that does not primarily fight for a specific ethnic 
group and that receives outside military support.28 
Disaggregated conflict data has also made it 
possible to assess the effectiveness of conflict 
management efforts on a micro-level. For instance, 
while several seminal studies using cross-national 
data have established that the deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission in a country makes ceasefires 
more likely to hold29, it is only recently that a study 
was published that uses temporarily and spatially 
disaggregated data to show that the presence of a 
peacekeeping base shortens conflict episodes 
within the context of civil wars.30 
Two leading datasets have emerged that provide 
geographic information on conflict events: the UCDP 
GED and ACLED.31 ACLED records data in ‘real time’, 
publishing conflict data on 60 developing countries 
in Africa and Asia every month. ACLED, in general, 
does a better job than UCDP GED in identifying 
incidents in which no fatalities are reported. 
Moreover, unlike the UCDP GED, ACLED also reports 
                                                     
Modeling Sub-National Variation in Civil Conflict Risk. 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 28: 15-40. 
28 Beardsley K, Gleditsch KS and Lo N. (2015) Roving 
Bandits? The Geographical Evolution of African Armed 
Conflicts. International Studies Quarterly 59: 503-516. 
29 Doyle MW and Sambanis N. (2006) Making War and 
Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, Fortna VP. (2008) Does 
peacekeeping work? shaping belligerents' choices after civil 
war, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
30 Ruggeri A, Dorussen H and Gizelis T-I. (2017) Winning the 
Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict. 
International Organization 71: 163-185. 
31 In addition, the locations of all militarized interstate 
disputes in the COW project’s Militarized Interstate 
on non-violent events like troop movements and 
protests. However, the data quality of ACLED is very 
uneven. Compared to the UCDP GED, ACLED 
relatively often miscodes the location information of 
an incident. In a comparison between the two 
datasets, Eck finds that ACLED coders do not always 
distinguish between villages with the same name.32 
For instance, Eck notes that “an ACLED event for 
Burundi on June 13, 2000 states that ‘Rebels tried to 
return to Tanzania through Musumba in Kinyinya 
Commune, but were repelled by police operating in 
Moso region.’ The incident is geocoded to Musumba 
in Ngozi province, which is not on the border of 
Tanzania. It should have been coded to Musumba in 
Ruyigi province, which is where Kinyinya commune 
can be found. The location is thus some 150 
kilometers off, putting the location in northern 
Burundi instead of southeast Burundi.”33  
Eck’s finding is in line with a study by Duursma that 
compares ACLED data on the Darfur conflict with 
data collected by the Joint Mission Analysis Centre 
(JMAC) of the United Nations-African Union Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID). In this study, Duursma finds that 
ACLED sometimes codes the wrong location 
because the localities of the towns in which armed 
clashes take place often have the same name as the 
administrative centre of this locality. Consequently, 
ACLED often incorrectly geocodes the location of the 
administrative centre even if the news article refers 
to the locality.34 Finally, it should be noted that 
Weidman also has found some discrepancies 
between the locations reported in the UCDP GED and 
the “Afghanistan War Logs” compiled by the US army 
and released by WikiLeaks.35 In short, many possible 
cases are overlooked or incorrectly geocoded as the 
result of the use of media sources in the major 
conflict incident datasets. Disaggregated data holds 
great promise, but it is not always clear whether 
disaggregated event data points are correct. It thus 
of great importance to ensure the 
Disputes (MID) dataset have been geotagged. See: 
Braithwaite A. (2010) MIDLOC: Introducing the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute Location dataset. Journal of Peace 
Research 47: 91-98. 
32 Eck K. (2012) In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP 
GED and ACLED conflict events datasets. Cooperation and 
Conflict 47: 124-141. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Duursma A. (2017a) Counting Deaths While Keeping 
Peace: An Assessment of the JMAC's Field Information and 
Analysis capacity in Darfur. International Peacekeeping 24: 
823-847. 
35 Weidmann NB. (2015) On the Accuracy of Media-based 
Conflict Event Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59: 1129-
1149. 
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comprehensiveness and precision of conflict data 
when using these data. 
The use of media reports is not only problematic 
because of its impreciseness or systematic 
underreporting, but also because of biases in 
underreporting. These biases can lead to flawed 
conclusions. For example, drawing on the UCDP 
GED, Pierskalla and Hollenbach find a strong 
correlation between cell phone coverage and armed 
violence in Africa, arguing that cell-phone coverage 
allows for effective mobilisation.36 Using UCDP GED 
data, Weidmann also finds a strong correlation 
between cell phone coverage and armed violence in 
Afghanistan. Yet, when he uses military data from 
the US army – the so-called ‘Afghanistan War Logs’ 
– Weidmann finds that much of the correlation 
between cell phone coverage and armed violence is 
driven by the media-based data. In other words, the 
UCDP GED – and probably media-based datasets in 
general – are also more likely to report violent 
incidents in areas with high levels of cell phone 
coverage.37 
Comparing JMAC and ACLED on Darfur, Duursma 
also identifies a bias in media-based conflict data: 
the JMAC dataset generally is more likely to report 
armed clashes, yet, compared to ACLED, it is 
especially more likely to report on battles that are not 
between the Government of Sudan and rebel 
parties.38 A plausible explanation for this relative 
difference is that news media are prone to focus on 
the armed fighting relating to what Kalyvas 
describes as a civil war’s “master cleavage.”39 The 
media might be more likely to report on events in line 
with the narrative of this master cleavage.  
In addition, media-based data are often produced in 
real-time or within the same calendar year of when 
the violent event took place. However, the 
occurrence of violent events sometimes emerge 
much later. These type of events usually do find their 
way to much more detailed historical narratives (e.g. 
when the armed conflict is terminated), but media-
based datasets often ignore historical narratives. 
Indeed, it is very rare for a media-based dataset to be 
                                                     
36 Pierskalla JH and Hollenbach FM. (2013) Technology 
and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage 
on Political Violence in Africa. American Political Science 
Review 107: 207-224. 
37 Weidmann NB. (2016) A Closer Look at Reporting Bias 
in Conflict Event Data. American Journal of Political 
Science 60: 206-218. 
38 Duursma A. (2017a) Counting Deaths While Keeping 
Peace: An Assessment of the JMAC's Field Information 
and Analysis capacity in Darfur. International 
Peacekeeping  24: 823-847. 
‘updated’ based on historical research. De Waal 
describes several of such cases in the Horn of Africa, 
which were never included in the UCDP.40 
Another potential issue with the issue of incident 
data is the way in which data are often used in a 
subtle (or not-so-subtle) way to reinforce particular 
political narratives. The proliferation of data has 
often come without attendant scrutiny of the quality 
of the data points. Coding is almost always a 
reduction of a complex case. A lot of information is 
sacrificed to reduce a singular case to either to a 
discrete category or to a position on a continuous 
scale. How and what information is coded will 
influence how the data is read and used – and thus 
ultimately will determine what kind of knowledge can 
be produced. For this reason, coding can be regarded 
as political. Read and Mac Ginty note in this regard 
that a contradiction lies at the heart of conflict 
incident databases: “the adherence to conflict 
scientism ignores the highly subjective nature of the 
coding process.”41 This observation not only holds 
for datasets produced by scholars based on media 
reports, but also – and perhaps especially – for 
datasets produced by NGOs, international 
organisations, and governmental organisations. For 
instance, the data released by the US government on 
the scale of civilian death in the wake of the US-led 
coalition’s invasion in Iraq in 2003 did not reflect the 
scale of the civilian death that later became apparent 
with the “Iraq War Logs” published by WikiLeaks in 
October 2010.42 
Finally, several new types of data collection efforts 
have emerged that could remedy some the flaws of 
media-based conflict data, particularly with regard to 
data collection efforts on armed violence in Syria. 
Conflict data on Syria is emerging based on new 
Internet based sources, including social media, 
crowd seeding, and citizen journalism. The Syrian 
conflict dataset at the London School of Economics 
is an example of a dataset based on crowd-seeding. 
The Carter Center is currently hosting a dataset on 
Syria based on social media, mostly on Twitter and 
YouTube. Using social media, the Carter Center has 
39 Kalyvas SN. (2003) The Ontology of “Political Violence”: 
Action and Identity in Civil Wars. Perspectives on Politics 1: 
475-494. 
40 De Waal A. (2004) The Politics of Destabilisation in the 
Horn, 1989-2001. In: De Waal A (ed) Islamism and Its 
Enemies in the Horn of Africa. London: Hurst. 
41 Read R and Mac Ginty R. (Unpublished manuscript) The 
Politics of Coding Violence: Exploring the Ontologies of 
Security Incident Databases. 
42 See: https://wikileaks.org/irq/. 
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identified 60,000 conflict events in Syria since it 
began collecting data in January 2015.  
With all these new type of data collection efforts 
underway it clear that the major obstacle to data-
driven conflict research is not necessarily a lack of 
data, but that these different datasets have not been 
merged enough. The main reason for this is that 
these datasets are all developed independently from 
one another, often with a singular purpose. Hence, 
what is necessary in the future is creating 
‘networked’ data – a network of network data – 
through merging different types of data on the basis 
of common guidelines. 
In sum, the lack of disaggregated data has meant 
that it is only recently that the study of the micro-
dynamics of civil wars and armed violence have 
become feasible; previously, conflict data has been 
highly aggregated, commonly at the country level. 
Disaggregated conflict data has become available 
with the creation of datasets like ACLED and the 
UCDP GED. While these type of data hold great 
promise, it is important to be aware of the biases of 
these data, as well as the politics of coding conflict 
events. The next section reviews how disaggregated 
data also allows for a greater focus on agency – and 
how this furthers the study of the micro-level 
dynamics of conflicts. 
Using Conflict Data to Analyse the 
Logics of Armed Conflict 
 
This section shows that disaggregated conflict data 
can help study the micro-level dynamics of conflicts. 
Disaggregated data helps to study the local nature of 
armed conflict, but also shifts the focus to agency 
rather than structural variables associated with a 
given country. Gleditsch et al. note that “Early studies 
tended to treat civil war as something that 
‘happened’ in specific countries, with little interest in 
who may engage in conflict and their plausible 
motivation for doing so.”43 A telling example of such 
a study is the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 
who focused on macro-level indicators, like a 
country’s GDP or the presence of lootable resources 
in a country, to make claims about rebel motivations 
to take up arms.44 From this perspective, civil wars 
may seem inevitable in ‘weak states’ or will occur 
                                                     
43 Gleditsch KS, Metternich NW and Ruggeri A. (2014) Data 
and progress in peace and conflict research. Journal of 
Peace Research 51: 301-314. 
44 Collier P. (2000) Rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity. 
Journal of Confl. Resolution 44: 83, Collier P and Hoeffler A. 
whenever feasible. This perspective also focuses 
exclusively on the motives of the armed opposition, 
as though governments cannot initiate violence 
leading to war. Macro-level studies are thus unable 
to provide insight into the where and who of armed 
violence. 
In order to show the merit of micro-level studies that 
are focused on agency and based on disaggregated 
data, the following three sub-sections will review 
how some recent quantitative work and their 
associated datasets are relevant for examining the 
three logics identified by the CRP. 
The Political Marketplace 
The first logic is the logic of a political marketplace, 
which is a materialist logic that relates to the 
transactional nature of the politics of conflict. The 
political marketplace refers to politics shaped by rent 
and patronage, in which power is about access to 
resources and at the same time resources are 
needed to sustain power and the various clientilistic 
networks that underpin power positions. Hence, the 
leaders of conflict parties will try maximize their 
budget in order to maximize their chances of 
survival. De Waal’s description of how the wish to 
maximize the political budget can motivate a rebel 
leader to wage war or make peace is worth quoting 
at length: “By threatening or staging a rent-seeking 
rebellion, a commander, chief or local administrator 
attracts attention, advertise his intent and 
determination, and strikes up a round of bargaining. 
[…] The rebellion is settled through a payroll peace: 
its leader is given a promotion and his fighters are 
put on the army payroll: arrears are paid, pay rises 
awarded, and more soldiers – real ones and ghosts 
– are salaried.”45 The leaders of conflict parties thus 
need a political budget to buy the loyalties of their 
constituency. 
Some studies that find quantitative support for the 
logic of the political marketplace have already been 
published. Examining how the civil war in Tajikistan 
ended, Jesse Driscoll argues that the government 
side managed to lure warlords into the state based 
on promises of future financial rewards. The point of 
departure of this study is thus that while many civil 
wars end in a military victory by the incumbent 
regime, this rarely involves a comprehensive 
battlefield defeat. Instead, insurgent field 
(2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic 
Papers 56: 563-595. 
45 Emphasis in the original. de Waal A. (2015) The Real 
Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business 
of Power, Cambridge: Polity. 
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commanders are often selectively co-opted within 
the state. To test this argument, Driscoll created a 
dataset of 97 field commanders with biographical 
information on each of these commanders, including 
information such as the number of the fighters they 
command. Of these 97 field commanders, 57 joined 
the state between 1992 and 1997. A closer look at 
why these field commanders joined the state 
suggest that regardless of their characteristics, 
these field commanders were given amnesty and 
allowed to make large sums of money. A survival 
analysis based on these data suggests that the 
former war lords who had ties to the KGB or the ‘deep 
state’ were relatively likely to keep their job. Yet, 
Driscoll finds that in general warlords were very likely 
to be pushed out of their jobs. By December 2006, 
only sixteen out of the 57 field commanders that had 
joined the state between 1992 and 1997 remained. 
Former war lords were pushed out of their jobs at a 
rate of about three per year. As Driscoll puts it, “Most 
field commanders found that the arrangement which 
initially convinced them to join the state was void 
within a decade.” What is more, in most of the cases 
in which former war lords lost their jobs, this 
occurred in the context of pitting different warlord 
factions against one another. This suggests that in 
addition to co-opting, the regime led by President 
Emomali Rahmon also engaged in a divide-and-rule 
strategy to maintain a monopoly on the use of 
violence within the state. 
In another study that finds evidence supporting the 
logic of the political marketplace, Lee Seymour finds 
that political rivalries and patronage-based 
incentives – rather than ideological and ethnic 
cleavages, territorial control, or the balance of power 
– explain why armed actors switch sides in civil 
wars. In his dataset on side-switching in the north-
south Sudan civil war and the civil war in Darfur, 
Seymour measures patronage incentives to induce 
side-switching as “collaboration contingent on 
material rewards, tracing the patronage politics 
behind alignments as closely as possible.”46 While 
Seymour’s findings are plausible and line with 
observations from in-depth case studies, the 
problem with the data collected for this study is that 
is arguably easier to identify cases in which side-
switching actually happened in anticipation of 
material rewards than it is to identify cases in which 
side-switching was refused, but in which material 
rewards were nevertheless offered as an incentive to 
switch sides. This potentially biases the findings 
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Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan. 
International Security 39: 92-131. 
towards a conclusion that patronage incentives 
induce side-switching. 
In a study that indirectly addresses dynamics related 
to the political marketplace, Milli Lake shows that 
efforts to build post-conflict institutions aimed at 
establishing a rule of law are often undermined 
because of transactional politics. Lake draws on 
several data sources – including both NGO reports 
and media-based datasets like ACLED and the UCDP 
GED – to identify 329 conflict incidents in North Kivu 
and South Kivu between 2005 and 2012.  With the 
help of legal experts from the DRC, Lake 
subsequently finds that 79 of these 329 cases 
constituted a basis for a case file. Focusing on these 
79 cases, Lake further finds that only 36 of these 
cases were in fact a case file. What is more, only 
eight of these 36 case files led to a trial. A qualitative 
assessment of the factors that explain why certain 
cases progress towards a trial suggests that elites 
often obstruct accountability efforts against 
adversaries when doing so can be exchanged for 
political, military, or economic payoffs from rival 
factions. In other words, Lake shows how 
institutions are used as a tool in the political 
marketplace. The threat of possible prosecution is 
used as a bargaining strategy to get more power. 
Lake thus essentially shows how patronage-based 
politics are also evident in the workings of formal 
institutions.47  
In sum, while it is in practice almost impossible to 
measure political budgets and the price of loyalty 
directly – as doing so would require significant 
intelligence resources – some studies have analysed 
networks and relationships to study transactional 
politics in relation to conflict. Yet, it is clear that the 
covert actions of the political business leaders 
conducting transactional politics makes studying 
the political marketplace difficult. In her study of the 
political marketplace in Tajikstan, Driscoll simply 
assumes that former field commanders want to 
assume a position within the state for financial gain. 
Seymour uses a binary variable that whether 
financial incentives motivated a field commander to 
switch sides. Future research should try to develop 
more precise proxy indicators of the political 
marketplace and collect more rigorous data. 
 
 
47 Lake M. (2017) Building the Rule of War: Postconflict 
Institutions and the Micro-Dynamics of Conflict in Eastern 
DR Congo. International Organization 71: 281-315. 
15          Data Synthesis Paper, July 2017  
Moral Populism 
The second logic is an ideational logic and relates to 
the use of populist narratives generally involving 
exclusion as a tool for political mobilisation. Moral 
populism can involve ethnic sectarianism, religious 
extremism, or appeals to the spirit world and to 
witchcraft. In essence, moral populists construct a 
narrative to create a sense of community among 
their followers to the exclusion of others. Identity 
politics is at the heart of this narrative, meaning that 
leaders claim authority on the basis of their 
identity.48 Some large-n studies have specifically 
focused on the ethnic and religious identity 
component of moral populism. While this is often a 
dominant factor, it does not need not be the 
exclusive one. 
A traditional view within conflict research is that 
authorities that consistently fail to provide public 
services face a higher chance of armed resistance. 
Indeed, since Ted Gurr published Why Men Rebel in 
1970, a dominant view within conflict research is that 
relative deprivation can lead to grievances, which, in 
turn, can result in intergroup armed conflict.49 The 
causal mechanism that connects grievances to 
armed conflict is that grievances motivate groups to 
take up arms to change the status quo, but also that 
grievances allow elites to effectively mobilise a 
fighting force. Around the turn of the century, some 
studies were published that argued against looking 
at political and economic grievances to explain the 
onset of war. These studies instead focused on 
opportunity structures. However, the findings of 
these studies were based on questionable data. For 
instance, it was concluded that inequality did not 
increase the likelihood of civil war, but the indicators 
of inequality related to the level of individual 
inequality.50 Frances Stewart shifted the focus from 
individual inequality to inequality between groups – 
and in doing so found that higher levels of inequality 
between different groups in a given country make 
armed conflict significantly more likely.51 Cederman 
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50 See for example: Fearon J and Laitin D. (2003) Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War. The American Political Science 
Review 97: 75-90, Collier P and Hoeffler A. (2004) Greed and 
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51 Stewart F. (2002) Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected 
Dimension of Development. QEH Working Paper Series, 
Number 81, Stewart F. (2008) Horizontal Inequalities and 
Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic 
Societies: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
et al. take this research agenda further through 
drawing on disaggregated data that specifies the 
inequality between different (ethnic) groups within a 
country. Using a spatial method that combines 
geocoded data on ethnic groups’ settlement areas 
with indicators of spatial wealth, Cerderman et al. 
show that civil war is more likely in highly unequal 
societies. Moreover, within these highly unequal 
societies, both rich and poor groups are more likely 
to fight than those groups whose wealth lies closer 
to the country average.52  
While Cederman et al.’s finding is highly informative, 
it does not necessarily provide an answer as to why 
individuals join a rebellion. Addressing the personal 
reasons for joining the rebel or the government side 
in civil wars, Humphreys and Weinstein conducted a 
survey in Sierra Leone.53 Through this survey they 
recorded the attitudes and behaviour of 1,043 ex-
combatants alongside a sample of 184 non-
combatants in Sierra Leone’s civil war. The survey 
suggests that indicators for grievances – including 
economic deprivation and a lack of access to 
education – are significant predictors of 
participation in violence.54 Yet, crucially, these 
indicators are not only significant for individuals 
participating in rebel violence, but also for individuals 
participating in the defence of the state. 
Marginalisation might thus produce a greater 
disposition to participate in violence, but not 
necessarily because of a willingness to change the 
status quo. Furthermore, the survey results suggest 
that combatants often joined because of financial 
reasons. Humphreys and Weinstein also find that 
abductions of fighters occurred very often, shedding 
doubts about whether people always have agency 
over their decision to participate in violence. In short, 
while shifting the focus to the individual, Humphreys 
and Weinstein find that opportunity rather than 
grievances explain the participation in violence. The 
only exception in this regard is that they find that 
compared to the non-combatants, many of the ex-
52 Cederman LE, Gleditsch KS and Buhaug H. (2013) 
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War: Cambridge University 
Press, Cederman L-E, Weidmann NB and Gleditsch KS. 
(2011) Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil 
War: A Global Comparison. American Political Science 
Review 105: 478-495. 
53 Humphreys M and Weinstein JM. (2008) Who Fights? The 
Determinants of Participation in Civil War. American 
Journal of Political Science 52: 436-455. 
54 Note, however, that due to endogeneity issues, the 
relationship between poverty and armed violence is difficult 
to establish. On this, see: Justino P. (2009) Poverty and 
Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes 
and Duration of Warfare. Journal of Peace Research 46: 
315-333. 
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combatants did not support any political party when 
they joined the national army or a rebel group. This 
suggest that individuals that are alienated from 
mainstream political processes are more likely to 
participate in violence.55 It might be the case that 
these political alienated individuals in Sierra Leone 
were particularly susceptible to the messages of 
moral populists. 
In addition to research on possible grievances that 
allow a basis for mobilisation, contemporary 
quantitative research focuses on the role of 
identities within civil wars. A debate is currently 
unfolding about what the most salient cleavage is for 
mobilisation in civil wars. Monica Toft argues that 
religion is the most salient factor and presents data 
that suggests that armed opposition groups that 
have their demands explicitly anchored in a religious 
tradition have become increasingly common 
between 1945 and 2000.56 Challenging the argument 
that political violence is more likely to occur along 
religious divisions, Bormann et al. argue that 
linguistic divisions are the most conflict prone. They 
provide evidence for this argument by analysing 
relational data that records ethnic differences 
between potential challengers and the politically 
dominant group in a country. A major advantage of 
this data – referred to as the Ethnic Power Relations 
– Ethnic Dimensions (EPRED) dataset – is that this 
dataset also includes dyads which did not escalate 
to civil war. In other words, this data offers a more 
exogenous starting point to examine the onset of 
civil war, rather than the ex-post coding of 
mobilisation and subsequent war. Moreover, while 
Toft codes civil wars as either religious or linguistic, 
the dataset used by Bormann et al. allows for an 
ethnic dyad to be both religious and linguistic. 
Bormann et al.’s analysis suggests that intrastate 
conflict is more likely within linguistic dyads than 
among religious ones. Moreover, controlling for a set 
of possible cofounding variables, Bormann et al. do 
not find support for Toft’s argument that Muslim 
countries are disproportionately likely to experience 
civil war.57 
Mobilisation plays a major role in the theoretical 
arguments of both Bormann et al. and Toft. For 
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instance, Toft argues that since religious authority 
often transcends the authority of the state, religious 
groups are relatively less hampered by collective 
action problems that impede the mobilisation of 
fighters.58 Yet, neither Toft nor Bormann et al. 
explicitly test the role of a linguistic or religious 
identity in the mobilisation process leading up to civil 
war. Hence, these studies are informative about 
what type of identities make the onset of a civil war 
more likely, but tell us relatively little about how 
moral populist play the identity card to mobilise 
fighters.  
In sum, while there are some quantitative studies 
that have examined the role of grievances, identity, 
and mobilisation, these studies have produced 
contradictory findings. What is more, these studies 
are all seriously hampered by the difficulty to 
operationalise these concepts. Indeed, since it is 
difficult to operationalise and measure ideas, moral 
populism is difficult to examine in a large-n study. 
Much of the current literature examines grievances 
and identities, assuming that these concepts explain 
the onset of civil war.59 Yet, crucially, the causal 
mechanisms that link elites evoking a narrative that 
enhances a sense of community among their 
followers on the one hand and the use of armed 
violence on the other hand have yet to be examined 
in quantitative research. A telling example in this 
regard is the robust finding that territorial intrastate 
conflicts are more difficult to resolve than non-
territorial intrastate conflicts.60 While some have 
suggested that this is due to the symbolic value of 
territory, which allows elites to mobilise many 
fighters, this claim has not been tested in a 
quantitative study – and doing so would be 
exceptionally difficult. 
Civicness 
The logic of public civicness refers to public 
authority based on something akin to a social 
contract rather than top-down economic or 
ideological pressures. Civicness thus relates to the 
delivery of public services by either the state or non-
state actors. Much of the conflict data and 
quantitative research has focused on violent conflict, 
59 A notable exception is Basedau M, Fox J, Pierskalla JH, 
et al. (2015) Does discrimination breed grievances—and do 
grievances breed violence? New evidence from an analysis 
of religious minorities in developing countries. Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 34: 217-239. 
60 See: Toft MD. (2002) Indivisible territory, geographic 
concentration, and ethnic war. Security Studies 12: 82-119, 
Toft MD. (2003) The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, 
Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, Princeton 
Princeton University Press. 
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while ignoring mass non-violent protest in societies 
over the failure of the delivery of public services. Due 
to the focus on violence in conflict data, the role of 
civil society in preventing contentious politics from 
escalating into violence conflict has been 
understudied. To remedy this gap in research, Bond 
et al. conducted a major data collection effort in the 
mid-1990s – based on the first automated coding 
software used by conflict researchers called the 
Kansas Event Data System (KEDS)61 – to examine 
the role of civil society in mass political conflict.62 
They developed indices for two related concepts: (1) 
the conflict carrying capacity, which they defined as 
a regime’s ability to regulate contentious 
interactions without resorting to violence; and (2) 
conflict civility, defined as the dominance of 
nonviolent (civil) coercion in mass contentious 
actions. Global data on violent and nonviolent 
incidents between 1987 and 1997 suggest that the 
more democratic and open regimes display stable 
and high conflict carrying capacity and conflict 
civility. Autocratic regimes can also score relatively 
stable on these indicators for an extended period of 
time, but the conflict carrying capacity of autocratic 
regimes can drop rapidly if autocratic leaders are 
faced with a high number of contentious actions.63 
Bond et al. thus essentially show that conflict 
researchers were too much focused on collecting 
data that solely pertains to violent events. Even if one 
is solely interested in explaining the onset of armed 
conflict, one should also examine conflict in the 
context of civil interactions.  
Another issue that was understudied until recently is 
the effectiveness of popular mobilisation aimed at 
regime change. As early as 1973, Gene Sharp argued 
that that nonviolent action is generally more 
effective than violent action.64 Yet, this claim was 
subsequently never tested using systematic data. 
This is precisely the gap in research taken up by 
Chenoweth and Stephan in their study on the 
effectiveness of nonviolent resistance.65 Chenoweth 
and Stephan draw on the Nonviolent and Violent 
Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Dataset, which 
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includes violent and nonviolent resistance 
campaigns between 1900 and 2006. A campaign is 
defined as “as a series of observable, continuous, 
purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a 
political objective.”66 The criterion for the inclusion 
of violent campaigns draws on the COW project’s 
1,000 battle-related death criteria, while nonviolent 
campaigns are included if at least 1,000 protesters 
were involved in the nonviolent campaign. Drawing 
on the NAVCO dataset, Chenoweth and Stephan 
show that campaigns of nonviolent resistance were 
more than twice as effective as their violent 
counterparts. Moreover, the number of participants 
in nonviolent campaigns is generally much higher, a 
finding which the authors explain by pointing out that 
there are fewer obstacles to moral and physical 
involvement in nonviolent campaigns. Finally, 
Chenoweth and Stephan show that successful 
nonviolent resistance movements are relatively likely 
to progress to internally peaceful democracies.67 
The work of Chenoweth and Stephan has led to the 
emergence of a rapidly expanding research agenda 
on nonviolent conflict. One promising research area 
seems to be the study of transitions from violent 
resistance to nonviolent resistance. To examine the 
reason why militant organisations use violent or 
nonviolent methods, one recent study by Shellman et 
al. models why the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (LITE) 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 
Philippines used violent or nonviolent methods.68 
The dataset developed for this study is built by 
automatically coding sentiment data using 
advanced natural language processing software.69 
This software automatically codes sentiments 
expressed by citizens in news articles along a scale 
from -10 to 10. The main explanatory variable in 
Shellman’s et al. study is a monthly average of the 
sentiment against the government side and the 
dissidents. The dependent variable of interest is the 
onset of a violent phase in a given month. The focus 
is thus on phases within a conflict. To ensure that 
endogeneity issues do not bias the findings, all 
independent variables, including the monthly 
66 Ibid. In addition, NAVCO 2.0 has been released, which 
takes the nonviolent and violent conflict dyad as unit of 
analysis. See: Chenoweth E and Lewis OA. (2013) 
Unpacking nonviolent campaigns. Journal of Peace 
Research 50: 415-423. 
67 Chenoweth E and Stephan MJ. (2011) Why Civil 
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent 
Conflict, New York: Columbia University Press. 
68 Shellman SM, Levey BP and Young JK. (2013) Shifting 
sands: Explaining and predicting phase shifts by dissident 
organizations. Journal of Peace Research 50: 319-336. 
69 This automated coding software is much more advanced 
than, for example, the KEDS. 
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average of the sentiment, are lagged by one month.  
The sentiment data employed by Shellman et al. 
allows them to much better predict whether violent 
or nonviolent methods are used in a given month 
than if they would not draw on the sentiment data. A 
negative societal sentiment towards the government 
in a previous month is a significant predictor for the 
onset of a violent phase initiated by the LITE and the 
MILF. A positive sentiment towards the dissidents is 
only significantly correlated with the onset of a 
violent phase in the case of MILF. 
In sum, civicness has received scant attention in the 
quantitative conflict research literature. A plausible 
explanation for why this is the case is that the 
concept is difficult to operationalise and measure. 
Yet, a research agenda is emerging that pays 
attention to the role of civil society when modelling 
conflict. A crucial area of research seems to be 
evolution of nonviolent conflict into violent conflict. 
In spite of this study by Shellman et al., relatively little 
remains known about how nonviolent campaigns 
evolve into violent campaigns. The political conflicts 
between opposition groups and the state in several 
Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East 
that emerged in 2011 all took place initially in the 
form of non-violent uprising, but the outcomes were 
diverse. This demonstrates that incompatible goals 
between parties, even in highly insecure 
environments, do not necessarily lead to the use of 
violence.  
Interventions 
 
This section first reviews what types of data-driven 
research has been conducted on sector security 
reform (SSR). Next, some of the peacemaking 
literature is reviewed, with particular attention being 
paid to local mediation efforts. The subsequent sub-
section addresses how humanitarian data and 
conflict data are currently not yet linked. This is 
particularly apparent when it comes to data on food 
security.  
Sector Security Reform 
Most of the studies on SSR frame the issue in terms 
of the effectiveness of a standardised template of 
SSR.70 Moreover, these studies typically draw on 
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cross-national data and focus on macro-level 
dynamics. In the first systematic study that looks 
specifically at rebel-military integration, Glassmyer 
and Sambanis find that integration does not have a 
significant impact on preventing civil war 
recurrence.71 Yet, Glassmyer and Sambanis show 
that the reason why rebel-military integration has not 
been an effective peacebuilding mechanism is 
related more to poor implementation of peace 
agreements, which often include provisions for 
demobilisation and integration, than the inclusion of 
a rebel-military integration provision in the 
agreement itself. Similarly, Krebs and Licklider find 
that military integration may be a consequence 
rather than a cause of peace: when the underlying 
conditions for peace exist, military integration 
succeeds, and when they do not, integration fails.72 
This reflects an earlier finding by Hoddie and 
Hartzell, in an article that examines the impact of the 
implementation of military power-sharing provisions 
on the durability of peace agreements.73 Hoddie and 
Hartzell understand military power-sharing not only 
as creating a unified army, but also consider 
provisions that stipulate that conflict parties 
maintain their own forces in different areas. 
Focusing on 16 peace agreements concluded 
between 1980 and 1996 that included provisions for 
the sharing or dividing of military power among the 
former adversaries, Hoddie and Hartzell find that the 
complete implementation of military power-sharing 
provisions significantly improves the prospects for 
maintaining peace. However, it is very well possible 
that Hoddie and Hartzell’s study suffers from 
reversed causality: conflict parties that are 
motivated to maintain the peace are probably also 
more likely to implement military power-sharing 
provisions. 
Most studies solely examine the macro-level 
dynamics of the restructuring of the security sector. 
A notable exception is a study by Humphreys and 
Weinstein, in which they examine the micro 
dynamics of DDR efforts, focusing on the factors 
that explain the successful demobilisation of former 
combatants.  Drawing on a dataset of ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone, they find that those 
former combatants that have participated in an 
abusive military faction are the least likely to 
succeed in achieving social reintegration. 
72 Krebs RR and Licklider R. (2016) United They Fall: Why 
the International Community Should Not Promote Military 
Integration after Civil War. International Security 40: 93-138. 
73 Hoddie M and Hartzell C. (2003) Civil War Settlements 
and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing 
Arrangements. Journal of Peace Research 40: 303-320. 
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Humphreys and Weinstein further find that wealthier 
and more educated combatants face greater 
difficulties to reintegrate economically and 
politically. Ideologues and younger fighters are the 
most likely to retain strong ties to their former 
factions. Finally, and crucially, Humphreys and 
Weinstein find that externally funded DDR programs 
are not more likely to facilitate DDR success.74 
In short, some quantitative work has emerged on 
SSR. Most of the evidence points in the direction that 
SSR is ineffective in preventing a resumption of 
violence. The work that does find a positive 
correlation between the implementation of SSR and 
the durability of peace likely suffers from 
endogeneity. What is currently still missing within the 
quantitative literature on DDR and SSR, however, are 
studies that model reform effectors in what has been 
referred to as the security arena rather than the 
security sector.75 Many different actors operate 
simultaneously in this security arena, including 
government forces, police, security services, rebel 
factions, and militias. The CRP will frame the 
contested security landscape in a conflict-affected 
country as a security arena, and with the intent to 
study the political drivers of controlling security 
actors and reducing violence.  Indeed, future large-n 
research on SSR should try to model the complexity 
and fluidity of the security arena. 
Local Mediation 
Much of the literature on peacemaking efforts 
focuses on peacemaking between states. For 
instance, drawing on ICB data, Beardsley finds that 
mediated peace agreements concluded to end 
international crises between states are often 
unsustainable.76 Some studies do focus on 
mediation efforts to end a civil war, but the mediation 
efforts considered in these studies often are 
conducted by international third parties and focus on 
reaching a comprehensive peace agreement that 
brings peace to the entire country. For instance, 
focusing on civil wars in Africa, Duursma finds that 
African mediation efforts are more likely to lead to 
the conclusion of peace agreements than non-
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African mediation efforts, but that mixed mediation 
efforts in which African and non-African third parties 
cooperate are the most effective.77 Furthermore, 
data for mediation processes – as opposed to 
outcomes – is extremely poor, because most 
mediation processes have not been properly 
documented. Mediation archives are either non-
existent or confidential, so researchers rely on 
mediators’ memoirs for assessing what happened, 
and these are selective and subjective. In short, 
those large-n studies that do focus on peacemaking 
in civil war mainly look at efforts aimed at concluding 
a comprehensive peace agreement that is supposed 
to bring peace to the entire country.78 
Yet, many peacemaking efforts in civil wars are 
‘local’ and take place below the surface of highly 
publicised peace processes.79 Most of the existing 
datasets overlook these local peacemaking efforts.  
An exception is the Political Settlements Research 
Programme at the University of Edinburgh, which 
includes local agreements in their dataset. This 
dataset records around 1400 peace agreements 
between 1990 and 2016, though the vast majority of 
these agreements pertain to peace processes aimed 
at bringing peace to the entire country.80 One dataset 
that does specifically focus on local peacemaking 
efforts is the Syrian Conflict dataset at the London 
School of Economics. These data have been 
collected through crowdseeding conflict and peace 
events throughout various locations in Syria. What 
the Syrian Conflict dataset lacks in terms of the 
comprehensive coverage of Syria, it makes up in 
terms of the precision in terms of geo-coding (e.g. 
some observations in the dataset contain the exact 
coordinates of a building rather than the coordinates 
of a city like many other datasets). Moreover, the 
inclusion of local peace events makes the dataset 
fairly unique, making it possible to analyse the 
effectiveness of local peacemaking. 
Finally, while most studies on violent conflict use 
indicators like the conclusion of peace agreements, 
the implementation of peace agreements, or a lack 
of armed fighting to measure peace, Mac Ginty 
proposes to use bottom-up indicators of peace, 
Efforts. International Peacekeeping 24. See also: Duursma 
A. (2017c) When to Get Out of the Trench: Using Smart 
Pressure to Resolve Civil Wars. Civil Wars 17: 43-61. 
78 See also: Duursma A. (2014) A current Literature Review 
of International Mediation. International Journal of Conflict 
Management 25: 81-98. 
79 For example, see: Autesserre S. (2010) The Trouble with 
the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
80 See: http://www.peaceagreements.org/.  
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which he refers to as the Everyday Indicators of 
Peace. The underlying rationale of creating bottom-
up indicators of peace is the idea that locals often 
know very well whether peace is likely to be 
sustainable or not. For instance, after the troubles 
had in ended in Belfast, people started to replace the 
wooden pallets in front of the windows again with 
glass windows.81 A major bottom-up data collection 
effort in local communities in South Africa, South 
Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe has resulted in the 
development of indicators like armed men giving up 
their weapons, people being able to walk freely at any 
time, people being able to worship whatever religion 
people want, and inter-ethnic marriages; but the list 
is very long and diverse, since it has been produced 
on the basis of the input of locals.82 This makes the 
Everyday Indicators of Peace very hard to use as the 
basis for comparative work. 
In sum, while the analysis of local peacemaking 
efforts is already commonplace within the 
qualitative literature, data-driven research on local 
peacemaking has yet to develop. One 
straightforward way to measure the effectiveness of 
local peacemaking efforts would be to measure 
whether levels of violence decline, which essentially 
means measuring whether a concluded ceasefire 
holds. This approach, however, would miss 
important other aspects of peace which are 
measured in bottom-up indicators of peace, 
including for example community reconciliation. 
Humanitarian Action 
Humanitarian action takes place in all the countries 
on which the CRP focuses. Severe food insecurity is 
rampant throughout South Sudan, Somalia, and 
Syria. Conflicts in all the countries on which the CRP 
focuses have also produced large flows of displaced 
people. It is not difficult to see that the political 
marketplace has created the violent and predatory 
politics that led to the high levels of food insecurity 
and displaced people in these places. A confidential 
UN report on South Sudan concluded that "The bulk 
of evidence suggests that the famine in Unity state 
has resulted from protracted conflict." However, the 
quantitative conflict research that connects conflicts 
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to humanitarian issues is relatively underdeveloped.  
Crucially, there are no quantitative studies that 
connect the logic of the political marketplace to food 
insecurity. Yet, political marketplace metrics can be 
linked to food insecurity and humanitarian crisis. It is 
necessary to link the political marketplace to the 
food security because the political marketplace 
generates the predatory politics that creates food 
insecurity. Indeed, political entrepreneurs often 
reduce people to commodities or instruments of 
bargaining. 
Some studies have addressed the push and pull 
factors of displacement, including the presence of 
armed conflict.83 Other studies have addressed the 
impact of climate change and drought on conflict. 
For instance, von Uexkull et al. find, using 
disaggregated data on Africa and Asia from 1989 
onwards, that sustained periods of drought 
increases the likelihood of armed conflict in areas 
with agriculturally dependent groups and politically 
excluded groups in very poor countries.84  
What is missing from the literature is the linking of 
armed conflict and food insecurity in a quantitative 
and rigorous manner. A good start is the research 
that was recently published by Jones et al. in which 
they estimate the effect of food insecurity and state 
vulnerability on the occurrence of violent uprisings in 
Africa between 1991 and 2011.85 Using this data, the 
authors find that state vulnerability moderates the 
impact of food insecurity on the likelihood of 
violence. Another finding is that capable governance 
is an even better guarantor of peace than good 
weather. However, the measurement of food 
insecurity used by Jones et al. is based on 
questionable indicators. Jones et al. rely on three 
variables to measure a state’s susceptibility to food 
insecurity: “First, we capture how efficient and 
productive a state’s agricultural sector is using 
agricultural value added as a percentage of a state’s 
GDP, which measures net outputs minus inputs. 
Second, we capture how reliant on (and thus 
dependent on) agriculture a state is by including a 
measure of the percentage of a state’s land that is 
actively dedicated to agriculture. Finally, we include 
84 von Uexkull N, Croicu M, Fjelde H, et al. (2016) Civil 
conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 113: 12391-12396. 
85 Jones BT, Mattiacci E and Braumoeller BF. (2017) Food 
scarcity and state vulnerability: Unpacking the link between 
climate variability and violent unrest. Journal of Peace 
Research 54: 335-350. 
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a variable for a state’s imports as a percentage of the 
state’s GDP.”86  
In short, quantitative conflict research has a long 
way to go to examine the links between humanitarian 
issues and the political marketplace. This is 
particularly apparent with regard to the links between 
food security and armed violence. Jones et al. have 
examined the effect of food insecurity on armed 
violence, but they use questionable indicators of 
food security. Moreover, while food insecurity is 
indeed likely to influence armed conflict, the causal 
direction could also go the other way. 
Possible Ways Forward 
 
This final section identifies seven possible avenues 
for future data-driven research conducted by the 
CRP. 
Network Analysis 
It is increasingly recognised within the quantitative 
conflict literature that the armed opposition in armed 
conflict is not a homogenous movement.87 Some 
studies have examined why rebels fight other rebel 
movements.88 Another type of non-state armed actor 
to which scholars have turned their attention is 
militias.89 The numerous actors within the context of 
civil wars pose serious challenges to the data 
collection and analysis efforts of quantitative 
research scholars. One method of analysis that has 
the potential to deal with the complexity of 
contemporary wars is network analysis. An example 
of such an analysis is a study by Metternich et al. in 
which they find and employ data on conflicts in 
Thailand from 2001 to 2010 to show that fragmented 
opposition network structures lead to an increase in 
conflictual actions.90 
Syria is a telling example of a country in which a huge 
amount of armed actors operate. The CRP could 
initiate a collaboration among the different conflict 
data initiatives for Syria, with the Carter Center as a 
key player, in order to map all these different actors 
and analyse the causes and consequences of the 
changes in these networks. Since the Carter Center 
                                                     
86 Ibid. 
87 See: Cunningham KG, Bakke KM and Seymour LJM. 
(2012) Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56: 67-93, Bakke K, Cunningham K and Seymour 
L. (2012) A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and 
Infighting in Civil Wars. Perspectives on Politics 10: 265-
283. 
88 Fjelde H and Nilsson D. (2012) Rebels against Rebels. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 56: 604-628. 
began collecting conflict data on Syria on 1 January 
2015, it has identified 60,000 conflict events.91 The 
Syrian conflict dataset at the London School of 
Economics, which is based on crowd-seeding, would 
also be a very valuable resource to identify many 
conflict actors at specific sites throughout Syria. As 
this dataset is based on crowd-seeding, many actors 
have been added to this participatory network 
dataset over the course of the time frame that this 
dataset covers. 
In addition, the expert knowledge of the CRP country 
teams, as well as the local contacts of each country 
team, could be used to map relevant networks in 
each CRP focus country. If the JMAC data on the 
DRC and South Sudan will be obtained, these 
datasets could also be used to map networks. 
Collecting data on all relevant actors allows for an 
assessment of how conflict networks are shaped, 
transformed, and connected.  
Data on networks is very suitable for mapping the 
fragmentation of public authorities, as on the basis 
of these data different power networks can be 
identified. Having network data also makes it 
possible to examine how relations between different 
actors change. Crucially, with network data, the CRP 
could potentially analyse the logic of the political 
marketplace. One way to do this would be, for 
example, to examine whether transactional politics 
underlie changes in the relationships between all 
relevant actors in South Sudan from either 2005 or 
2011 onwards. In order to examine whether political 
marketplace considerations explain the changes in 
the network, one could examine each of these 
changes and code them accordingly. Alternatively, 
one could develop proxy indicators for the behaviour 
of political markets on relationships between 
different actors and levels of armed violence. For 
example, in the case of South Sudan, one could take 
the oil revenues the government generates as a 
proxy for the government’s political budget. In the 
case of Syria, one could examine whether defections 
to the Islamic State are more likely in the period 
following the levying of tax by the Islamic State; the 
assumption being that the Islamic State has a 
greater political budget in this period, allowing it to 
89 Raleigh C. (2016) Pragmatic and Promiscuous: 
Explaining the Rise of Competitive Political Militias across 
Africa. Ibid.60: 283-310. 
90 Metternich NW, Dorff C, Gallop M, et al. (2013) 
Antigovernment Networks in Civil Conflicts: How Network 
Structures Affect Conflictual Behavior. American Journal of 
Political Science 57: 892-911. 
91 https://www.cartercenter.org/syria-conflict-map/  
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buy the loyalties of potential defectors. Yet, it is 
acknowledged that better proxies should be 
developed. 
Non-Violent and Violent Resistance and 
Changing Patterns of Authority  
Another research project could focus on explaining 
how a centralised political authority fragments into 
localised contested public authorities. Syria is an 
insightful case to examine in this regard. Prior to 
2011, many observers interested in Syrian affairs 
believed that Syria was a stable state. Yet, minor 
protest in January 2011 had evolved into a massive 
uprising demanding democratic reforms by March 
2011. The creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 
July 2011 marked another turning point. A 
systematic analysis of data on nonviolent and violent 
resistance in Syria could shed light on how 
nonviolent protest escalated into armed conflict. 
Data on protests could be extracted from the Global 
Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) 
dataset. Data on armed clashes could also be 
extracted from the GDELT – or perhaps these data 
could be taken from ACLED and UCDP GED if these 
two datasets have published any data on Syria by the 
time this proposed research is conducted. The 
GDELT data – as well as the ACLED and UCDP GED 
data – are geocoded, making it possible to spatially 
analyse how nonviolent protests and violent 
resistance emerged. 
There is a conception that a mass uprising simply 
evolved into an armed uprising in Syria, yet there is a 
strong spatial element in this story that is often 
overlooked. While nonviolent protest emerged in 
urban areas, violent militias were mainly based in 
rural areas. The question, then, is what explains this 
difference?  Is it a difference in a greater propensity 
to use violence or is it just opportunity? A 
disaggregated sentiment analysis could perhaps 
shed light on whether a difference in sentiment in the 
urban areas or the rural areas explain this difference. 
Another question that could be examined in a spatial 
analysis is how areas where the dominant form of 
resistance was nonviolent protest transformed into 
areas where the dominant form of resistance was 
the use of violence. It could be examined whether 
this transformation is perhaps related to violent 
crackdowns by government forces.  
This research project relates to the logic of moral 
populism. If moral populists cannot fracture public 
                                                     
92 See: Duursma A. (2014) A current Literature Review of 
International Mediation. International Journal of Conflict 
Management 25: 81-98. 
civicness, they will resort to violent intimidation to 
curtail popular protest against them. A 
disaggregated analysis of the evolution of nonviolent 
and violent protest – with a focus on the interaction 
between the state, civil society, and the armed 
opposition – could shed light on aspects of the logic 
of moral populism. Disaggregated datasets make it 
possible, in principle, to move from the state, the 
individual, and armed groups as units of analysis to 
public authority. 
Peace Events 
Another promising research project would be to 
study the effectiveness of local peacemaking 
efforts. A wealth of studies have shown how likely 
ceasefires are to hold on a national level, yet what 
explains the durability of local ceasefires remains a 
gap in research. Studying peacemaking efforts using 
large-n data is important because peacemaking 
efforts fail very often. Different types of 
peacemaking efforts therefore need to be 
systematically compared to determine what works 
and what does not work. Biased conclusions are 
more likely if only a few instances of peacemaking 
are studied.92 
Borrowing a statistical technique from the medical 
literature in which the risk of a patient dying after 
having received some treatment is modelled, the 
hazard rates of a locally concluded ceasefire failing 
can be determined based on numerous factors that 
are associated with the conclusion of this ceasefire 
and which can be considered different types of 
treatment (i.e. the type and number of parties that 
are involved in the ceasefire agreement, whether a 
mediator was involved in the negotiations, whether a 
local or international mediator was involved, or the 
intensity of fighting prior to the conclusion of the 
ceasefire agreement).  
Since the Syrian Conflict data at the London School 
of Economics maps both peace and conflict events, 
this dataset could be used to model the 
effectiveness of local peacemaking. Another 
potential data source would be JMAC data on the 
DRC or South Sudan. Duursma shows that JMAC’s 
operational data not only offers great range of 
incidents and disaggregation, but is also very 
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precise.93 Duursma also shows that JMAC data94 on 
Darfur is suitable to assess the effectiveness of local 
peacemaking efforts. JMAC data on the DRC and 
South Sudan is likely to also be suitable for this 
purpose. Additionally, another promising research 
project would be to study the long-term impact of 
mediation of land disputes in the DRC, but whether 
this is feasible depends on if it will be possible to get 
data on the resolution of land disputes in the DRC. 
Finally, an assessment of local peacemaking efforts 
in the DRC and/or South Sudan could also be 
combined with a study of DDR efforts. Humphreys 
and Weinstein find that externally funded DDR 
programs are not more likely to facilitate DDR 
success.95 A study of local peacemaking efforts 
could examine the effectiveness of internally, 
politically driven DDR processes. This would make it 
possible to determine whether disbarments and 
demobilisation is more likely to succeed if it grows 
out of a wish by the communities to disarm 
themselves. 
The study of local peacemaking efforts, using 
systematic data, could provide insight in the logic of 
the public civicness, as well as the logic of the 
political marketplace. Local peacemaking efforts are 
often a result of a bottom-up call for peace. On the 
other hand, the logic of the political marketplace 
suggests that whether local peacemaking efforts are 
successful depends on whether political 
entrepreneurs can reach an agreement based on 
transactional politics. Depending on whether it will 
be possible to get systematic information on why 
armed actors conclude local agreements, a fruitful 
research project would be to examine whether 
successful local peacemaking efforts in the DRC 
and/or South Sudan are the product of skilled and 
resourced actors operating within a political 
marketplace.  
Displaced People and Conflict 
The CRP could also focus on how patterns of 
violence influence patterns of displacement of 
people and vice versa. Unsurprisingly, previous 
research has found that armed clashes motivate 
                                                     
93 Duursma A. (2017a) Counting Deaths While Keeping 
Peace: An Assessment of the JMAC's Field Information and 
Analysis Capacity in Darfur. International Peacekeeping 24: 
1-25. 
94 JMAC units are tasked with collecting and analysing 
information to support the leadership of UN peacekeeping 
missions. See: Shetler-Jones P. (2008) Intelligence in 
Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission 
Analysis Centre. International Peacekeeping 15: 517-527, 
Duursma A. (2018) Information Processing Challenges in 
Peacekeeping Operations: A Case Study on Peacekeeping 
people to flee their homes.96 However, the 
quantitative conflict research field has yet to fully 
examine the links between displacement and armed 
violence.  
Iraq would be a suitable country case to study the 
links between armed violence and displacement for 
two reasons.  Firstly, there is high quality data on 
both displacement and violence patterns on Iraq. 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
has data on patterns and levels of displacement 
across Iraq with very short time intervals, making it 
possible to track displacements over time. In terms 
of conflict data, one option would be to draw on the 
UCDP GED. Another much more comprehensive and 
precise, though also more controversial source, 
would be the so-called “Iraq War Logs” which was 
published by WikiLeaks in 2010 and contains 
391,832 geo-coded and categorised reports.97 
Secondly, and more importantly, Iraq has seen 
different waves of displaced people. The 
intervention in Iraq in 2003 by the US and its allies 
and the subsequent counterinsurgency operation 
displaced people from Fallujah, Najaf, Kufa, Ramadi, 
Kerbala, Tal Afar, Samarra, Basra, and Baghdad. 
Another wave of displacement occurred between 
2006 and 2008, as a result of sectarian violence. Yet 
another wave of displacement started with the 
Islamic State growing stronger from 2014 onwards. 
These different waves of displacement give a lot of 
variation in the data, which can be leveraged to get 
insights into when and where people flee from armed 
violence. For instance, it could be examined whether 
state-orchestrated displacement and displacement 
as a result of state collapse impact patterns of 
violence differently. Not only would it be possible to 
examine the impact of violence on displacement and 
the impact of displaced people settling in new areas 
on violence, but it would also be possible to examine 
the impact of displaced people returning to their 
place of origin. Finally, it would be a possibility to 
examine whether displacement from and to rural or 
urban areas have divergent effects. 
The study of patterns of displacements and violence 
relates to several overarching themes within the CRP 
Information Collection Efforts in Mali. International 
Peacekeeping25: 446-468. 
95 Humphreys M and Weinstein JM. (2007) Demobilization 
and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51: 531-
567. 
96 For example, see: Czaika M and Kis-Katos K. (2009) Civil 
Conflict and Displacement: Village-Level Determinants of 
Forced Migration in Aceh. Journal of Peace Research 46: 
399-418. 
97 See: https://wikileaks.org/irq/.  
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project. The different waves of displacements all 
took place under different contextual 
circumstances. For example, the wave of displaced 
people that took place between 2006 and 2008 was 
very much a result of sectarian violence, which, in 
turn, came about through moral populism. In 
addition, the different groups of displaced people in 
Iraq often relate to different authority structures. 
How these groups relate to particular authority 
structure might influence the propensity of armed 
conflict related to displacement. Finally, 
displacement does not necessarily have to result in 
violence. Indeed, the logic of public civicness might 
shed light on why people fleeing can maintain 
peaceful relations with their host community. 
Transnational Conflict Dynamics 
The CRP will also examine transnational conflict 
drivers, and in doing so this will also reveal important 
information about conflict networks.  Indeed, 
disaggregation is important, but it is equally 
important to look beyond the borders of a civil war 
state.98 The CRP will, among others, draw on the 
Transnational Violent and Coercive Politics in Africa 
(TVCPA) dataset. The TVCPA has been created as 
part of research conducted for a report conducted by 
the World Peace Foundation for the African Union.99 
The TVCPA can be extended to also cover the Middle 
East for the research purposes of the CRP. 
The TVCPA makes it possible to study the neglected 
transnational dimensions of armed conflicts in 
Africa. Previous research suggests that the number 
of interstate armed conflicts in Africa is relatively low 
in comparison to other regions of the world. For 
instance, Lemke found that “[…] there is something 
different, something exceptional about Africa in 
terms of interstate war. […] African dyads are 
disproportionately less likely to experience war than 
are non-African dyads. Not only is the effect 
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99 See: World Peace Foundation. (2016) African Politics, 
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statistically significant, but it is also substantively 
large. The risk ratio indicates that African dyads are 
only about one-tenth as likely to experience war as 
are other dyads. Even controlling for all of the ‘usual 
suspects,’ African dyads are disproportionately 
peaceful according to this analysis.”100 However, 
Lemke’s analysis only focuses on those instances in 
which interstate armed conflicts escalate beyond 
1,000 battle-related deaths. While interstate wars in 
Africa are indeed quite rare in comparison to the vast 
number of civil wars that Africa has experienced, 
African leaders often decide to support a foreign 
rebel party as a way to fight a rival state.101 Hence, 
what conventionality is considered a civil war is in 
fact often simultaneously an indirect confrontation 
between rival African states in which one or both of 
the states have decided to delegate the conflict to a 
foreign rebel party. This empirical reality blurs the 
lines of what conceptually can be meaningfully 
understood as a civil war.102 Moreover, Africa has 
experienced many low-level direct military 
confrontations between states. 
Several datasets exist that capture some elements 
of interstate, transnational violent and coercive 
politics in Africa. The Militarised Interstate Dispute 
(MID) dataset compiled by the COW project focuses 
on low-intensity military confrontations between 
states.103 The UCDP External support dataset 
focuses on external support to conflict parties in the 
form of troops, funding, logistics, military equipment, 
intelligence, and safe havens.104 These datasets 
have been used to generate important findings with 
regard to the role of MIDs105  and external support106 
respectively. Yet, a comprehensive dataset that 
captures a wide array of transnational conflict does 
currently not exist.  
The TVCPA fills this gap. The TVCPA dataset is built 
by combining, augmenting and revising several 
existing datasets each of which capture some 
104 Pettersson T. (2011) Pillars of Strength: External Support 
to Warring Parties. In: Pettersson T and Themnér L (eds) 
States in Armed Conflict 2010, Research Report no. 94. 
Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet. 
105 Senese PD and Vasquez JA. (2008) The Steps to War: An 
Empirical Study, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
Mitchell SM and Prins BC. (1999) Beyond Territorial 
Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized 
Interstate Disputes. International Studies Quarterly 43: 169-
183. 
106 Salehyan I, Gleditsch KS and Cunningham DE. (2011) 
Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. 
International Organization 65: 709-744, Sawyer K, 
Cunningham KG and Reed W. (2015) The Role of External 
Support in Civil War Termination. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 
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elements of transnational violent and coercive 
politics, including interstate wars, external state 
support in interstate wars, low-intensity 
confrontations between states, external 
interventions in civil wars, and external support to 
rebels or coup-makers. The TVCPA shows that the 
conventional wisdom that Africa has experienced 
little interstate conflict is stood on its head: the 
majority of African conflicts must be considered 
internationalised-internal.  
Moreover, the TVCPA data makes it possible to 
conduct a network analysis of transnational conflict. 
Such analysis could reveal which actors are central 
in providing support and which countries are the 
prime target of support, either for the regime or for 
rebel forces fighting against it. Changes over time 
could also be tracked this way, for example showing 
how countries rise or fall within the transnational 
political hierarchy. 
The analysis of transnational conflict data is relevant 
for the CRP because external support to domestic 
players has important ramifications for how the 
political marketplace operates. A leader of state that 
has a strong position in a regional marketplace can 
more efficiently prevent external support, which 
makes it easier to dominate the domestic patronage 
system. By contrast, leaders of a state in a 
subordinate position in the region will experience 
great difficulty in regulating entry into the political 
marketplace and deterring external support to 
rebels. Mapping the extent of transnational conflict, 
as well as shifts in which countries are the target of 
external support, thus gives insight into the 
dynamics of what de Waal refers to as a regionally 
integrated political marketplace.107 
Conflict, Political Markets, and Food 
Security 
The CRP will also address the links between conflict 
and food security. Many researchers have tried to 
find these links. Some have claimed to have done so, 
yet there is reason for serious caution in interpreting 
results as this research is often based on 
questionable proxy indicators of food security.108 
Moreover, if any links are found, these links are often 
indirect and mediated by other factors such as state 
capacity or poverty. Nevertheless, this topic is of 
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great importance and therefore warrants much 
better research. 
The principal data system used by humanitarians to 
assess food insecurity is the integrated food security 
phase classification (IPC) system, which is a five-
level scale that is intended to help governments and 
other humanitarian actors quickly understand a food 
crisis (or potential crisis) and take action. Indeed, the 
IPC is “designed from the perspective of decision-
making. Thus, rather than ‘pushing’ complex 
information to decision-makers, the IPC is designed 
to be demand driven – taking stock of the essential 
aspects of situation analysis that decision-makers 
consistently require, and focusing on providing that 
information in the most reliable, consistent and 
accessible way.”109 Phase 1 reflects “food secure”, 
phase 2 reflects “stressed”, phase 3 reflects “crisis”, 
phase 4 reflects “emergency”, and phase 5 reflects 
“famine”. These phase classifications sometimes 
relate to an administrative boundary and sometimes 
relates to a livelihood zone. The IPC data output is 
thus simply a number between 1 and 5 relating to a 
specific area. The famine that the UN has declared in 
Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen is based on the 
IPC system. What is more, the reason why famine 
has not yet been declared in Syria is likely due to the 
fact that Syria does not have an IPC mechanism in 
place. 
In addition to the IPC data, there is the Famine Early 
Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) data on food 
security. This data is IPC compatible, but not IPC per 
se. Moreover, the FEWSNET data is published for the 
current situation, but each FEWSNET report also 
includes 3 and 6 months forecasts.  
What number is assigned to a specific area in the IPC 
and FEWSNET data is the result of analytical 
judgment rather than purely an amalgamation of 
data. Data on nutrition, consumption, mortality rates, 
livelihood changes, and other relevant food security 
data is taken into account to come to this analytical 
judgement, but conflict data is generally ignored.  
It is striking that analyses on food security rarely 
takes conflict data into account. Datasets like 
ACLED could be used to get an indication of levels of 
armed violence in particular areas of a country. This 
information could, in turn, be used to get better 
predictions of food security. Political marketplace 
metrics can similarly be linked to food insecurity and 
the link between climate variability and violent unrest. 
Journal of Peace Research 54: 335-350. 
109 Partners G. (2012) The Integrated Food Security Phase 
Classification. Technical Manual Version 2.0: Evidence and 
Standards for Better Food Security Decisions. 
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humanitarian crisis. It is necessary to link the 
political marketplace to the food security because 
the political marketplace generates the predatory 
politics that creates food insecurity. Indeed, political 
entrepreneurs often reduce people to commodities 
or instruments of bargaining. The CRP research, on 
the links between the political marketplace, conflict, 
and food security would thus have to address 
questions about how conflict assessment data 
including violent incident reporting can be factored 
in to projections of humanitarian crises: is it possible 
to confidently predict that certain patterns of 
violence are predictors of worsening hunger? To 
answer this question, it will be examined how the 
processes of obtaining and analysing conflict data 
and food security data can be aligned, with the aim 
of enriching both. In addition, it could be examined 
how peace events and governance factors help in 
assessing food security.  
An analysis on the links between armed conflict 
events and food security will have to deal with at 
least three methodological challenges. First, it will be 
necessary to determine the appropriate time horizon 
over which the effects of armed conflict happen. 
Armed conflict probably has an immediate effect on 
food security, but perhaps the level of armed 
violence over the course of a year has to be taken 
into account as well. Second, it will be necessary to 
determine the spatial effects of armed violence on 
food security. Violence in one place, may affect food 
security in other places. For instance, armed violence 
could undermine the transport of food from ports 
and over roads. It is very challenging to model these 
spatial effects. Third, the causal direction of the 
correlation between armed violence and food 
security is difficult to establish. 
In short, none of the current humanitarian data 
programs used to assess food security take levels of 
conflict into account. The CRP could explore ways in 
which conflict data could help inform IPC 
assessments. 
Comparing Data Collection 
Methodologies and Setting up a Network 
of Networks 
The major obstacle to data-driven conflict research 
is arguably not necessarily a lack of data, but that 
different datasets have not been merged enough. 
The main reason for this is that these datasets are 
all developed independently from each other, often 
with a singular purpose. Hence, what is necessary in 
the future is creating ‘networked’ data – a network of 
network data – through merging different types of 
data on the basis of common guidelines. The CRP 
could lead a collaborative project that would try 
develop these type of guidelines and to create 
networked data. This project would also make a 
comparison possible of the strengths and weakness 
of different data sources, as well as the different 
methodologies used by actors collecting conflict 
data. 
ACLED and UCDP GED data is based on media 
reporting. A previous comparison between MAC data 
and ACLED data for Darfur showed that ACLED 
underreported on armed clashes. Yet, the quality of 
JAMC data might be uneven across time and space 
(moreover, JMAC data is only available for countries 
in which a UN peace mission is active). A relatively 
new type of data collection is currently pursued by 
the Carter Center. The Carter Center is pioneering 
new methods of recording conflict data in Syria, 
heavily drawing on social media to track events. This 
is an exciting new development, but it is currently 
unclear the extent to which the Carter Center fails to 
recorded certain events and what type of events 
would be missed. Comparing the different data 
collection efforts in Syria might give insight into the 
different biases of each data source.  
This research project would involve the 
“standardisation”, “pooling” and “validation" of data 
on the war in Syria. The Syrian case is a good choice 
for this project because it is well documented and 
extremely complex. “Standardisation” refers to the 
definition of guidelines for a lowest common 
denominator across datasets which they would have 
to fulfil to enable pooling. “Pooling” refers to the 
merging of existing datasets (e.g. the Carter Center 
and the London School of Economics datasets on 
Syria) to connect multiple topics and test richer 
hypotheses. “Validation” is the use of topically 
similar, overlapping datasets to check quality and 
learn methodologically. The overlap of these 
different datasets will make it possible to improve 
methodologies and data quality. 
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